Education
BA, Philosophy and Anthropology-Linguistics, Brown University
Ph.D.candidate, Brown University
"Since reading Philippa Foot’s classic paper 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', I’ve been fascinated by questions about the norms that govern different aspects of our lives. In virtue of what are we subject to moral evaluations like praise and blame? How do these assessments differ, if at all, in their underlying structure from assessments of rudeness or politeness in etiquette? Parallel questions arise in the case of belief: What are the conditions that determine whether we are forming our beliefs rationally or irrationally? And when and how are we responsible for this? “Internalist” responses to these questions ground responsibility for action and belief in cognitively accessible features of our psychological make-up. But given the limits of human self-knowledge, can internalists vindicate commonsensical intuitions about moral responsibility and rationality? " - Simon Feldman
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Joined Connecticut College: 2003
Specialization:
- Meta-ethics
- Ethics
- Philosophy of Law
Simon Feldman received his B.A. in Philosophy in 1994, then worked at the Center for the History and Philosophy of Science at Boston University and then spent time traveling across the United States. He eventually returned to do graduate work in philosophy at Brown University, where he is currently a doctoral candidate.
While at Brown, Feldman has taught courses in bioethics, philosophy of law and political philosophy. In 2003 he had the terrific experience of teaching Philosophy 101 at Connecticut College and presenting a talk titled “The (Limited) Attraction of Amoralism” in the philosophy department’s “Pizza and Profundity” series.
Feldman teaches Philosophy 101 and courses in Ethics, Philosophy of Law and Epistemology.
Feldman’s current work is focused on the relationship between morality and rationality. His dissertation defends the compatibility of commonsense morality with an agent-centered, “internalist” conception of practical reason. Moreover, this linkage between morality and internal reasons may provide the basis for a principled account of the limits of impartial morality (agent-centered options).
View the philosophy department site.